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Abstract
Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justifica-
tion and knowledge, and a great number of epistemolo-
gists endorse a particular two-part view about how this
happens. That view is that perceptual beliefs get their
justification from perceptual experiences, and that they
do so by being based on them. Despite the wide accep-
tance of these two views, I think that neither has very
much going for it; on the contrary, there’s good reason
not to believe either one of them.
It is uncontroversial that perception gives us knowledge and justification. It is widely believed,
though rarely or never argued in any detail, that this comes about in a particular way: namely, that
some beliefs are justified in virtue of being based on perceptual experiences. It is useful to separate
this received orthodoxy into two distinct but connected theses: (a) that “empirical beliefs” get
their justification from perceptual experiences, and (b) that they do so by being based on these
experiences, in something like the way inferential beliefs are based on premise beliefs. The first
dogma is, if you like, concerned with propositional justification and the second with doxastic
justification. In different jargon, the first concerns the role of experiences as reasons, the second
as causes. Any view that conjoins these two claims I’ll call “experientialism.”
Despite the absence of arguments for these views—or perhaps partly because of it—they are
very widely assumed in epistemology. The best-known dissenters are Sellars (1956) and Davidson
(1986), who argue against the first dogma, the latter famously concluding that experiences are
mere causes and not reasons. There’s no shortage of critiques of these arguments, but such cri-
tiques do not constitute positive evidence that experiences really do serve as reasons. The second
dogma—roughly, that experiences are at least causes—is broadly assumed, by both friends and
foes of the first dogma. To my knowledge, no one has ever really bothered to argue for it. Most
epistemologists seem to think both dogmas are pretty obviously true and not in need of serious,
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positive argument. I think that neither dogma is at all obvious, and in fact, there is much reason
to doubt both of them.
I’ve argued against experientialism before,1 but I don’t think I’ve wonmany converts. I’m going
to try here one last time. Some of the argumentation will be reminiscent of earlier work, but the
overall strategy is importantly different.My current arguments against the first dogma, (a), will be
muchmore direct, streamlined, and atheoretical thanmy previous efforts, which were embedded
in an attempt to understand the nature of perceptual experience. I want to see if setting aside this
explanatory ambition makes the anti-dogmatic argument more stark and more convincing. In
addition, the current argument bears no traces of Davidson or Sellars, similarity to which might
have led readers to think they’d already seen—and refuted—my earlier arguments. Unlike my
previous attempts, the argument this time will be entirely a priori. The second dogma, (b), is
something I’ve discussed before, but only very briefly. The arguments developed here against (b)
are entirely new, as far as I know.
I start in section 1 by trying to get clear on some central terms and concepts. In section 2, I dis-
cuss the first dogma, suggesting that experiences are inadequate for the propositional justification
of empirical beliefs. In section 3, I turn to the second dogma, arguing that three lines of empirical
inquiry cast doubt on the claim that empirical beliefs are dependent on experiences in the way
relevant to basing and doxastic justification. In sections 4 and 5 I consider two possible responses
to the arguments of section 3. I briefly conclude in section 6.
I think both dogmas are probably false, but that’s not quite what I’m arguing here. The point of
calling them dogmas (rather than, say, lies) is simply that we don’t have any good reason to believe
them. My current ambitions will be fully satisfied if I can lead readers to agnosticism about the
dogmas.
1 CLARIFYING THE DOGMAS
It will be helpful to clarify some issues up front, since terminology varies.
Talk about experiences is, as I understand it, talk about certain kinds of consciousmental states
or events. The ones we’re currently interested in are perceptual states or events, but there might
be other kinds of experience as well (intellectual, mnemonic, emotional, etc.). I will assume that
experiences are nonfactive—that, e.g., you can have an experience as of red even though there’s
nothing red in your environment—although some theorists hold that only the veridical ones grant
(full) justification.2 Importantly, experiences are always to be understood as nondoxastic: no expe-
rience is also a belief.
The assumption that experiences justify beliefs is held by a range of theorists who otherwise dis-
agree deeply about important matters of epistemology. Some (including so-called “modest foun-
dationalists”) hold that experiences directly justify beliefs about things and properties in the exter-
nal world.3 A much older view (“classical foundationalism”) insists that they only directly justify
beliefs about one’s own mental states, and that beliefs about the external world are indirectly,
inferentially, justified by these.4 Modest foundationalism has largely supplanted classical foun-
dationalism as the dominant epistemology, the latter being widely deemed hyper-intellectualist,
requiring too much cognitive sophistication on the part of the perceiver (an issue I return to
below). It is natural to describe the justificandum beliefs for the modest foundationalist as “per-
ceptual beliefs” and for the classical foundationalist as “introspective beliefs,” since the former
beliefs are about the world and the latter about one’s own mental states; I’ll refer to both inclu-
sively as “empirical beliefs.” This will allow the discussion to stay neutral between the two views.
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It’s not only foundationalists who hold that experiences justify beliefs; “nondoxastic coheren-
tists” hold that justification arises from coherence but—contrary to traditional coherentism a la
BonJour (1985) and Lehrer (1990)—the coherence relation is defined partly over experiences and
not just beliefs.5
The first dogma is concerned with propositional justification: what experiences you’re hav-
ing determines what propositions it’s appropriate for you to believe. The second dogma is about
doxastic justification. Central to this is the idea of basing: the view isn’t simply that experiences
justify empirical beliefs, but that they do so in a particular way: they serve as the agent’s grounds,
or evidence, or reasons for the empirical belief. (These italicized terms are fraught, of course, and
sometimes used in different ways.) Basing is (at least for those beliefs that depend on reasons
or evidence) what makes the difference between propositional and doxastic justification.6 This
makes empirical justification quasi-inferential; believing p on the basis of an experience is at least
something like believing p on the basis of an inference from another belief, in that the experience
is to the belief—as the slogan goes—both reason and cause.
The precise nature of the basing relation is a difficult issue, partly because of wildly divergent
intuitions concerning Lehrer’s (1971) case of the superstitious lawyer, which purportedly shows
that no causal or counterfactual relation is needed for basing. I won’t try to defend it here, but in
what follows I will assume that whatever basing is, it does (pace Lehrer) require that the belief
bear some psychological dependence relation to the basis, and I’ll understand the second dogma
accordingly.7
Finally, I have stated the dogmas as generics, rather than as generalizations with explicit quan-
tifiers, partly because I want to be very inclusive about who counts as endorsing experientialism.
However, I take the experientialist to be committed to at least the claim that in common, ornormal,
or paradigmatic cases of empirical belief, the belief is based on and justified by an experience. This
will be especially important in section 3, wheremy argument is empirical. An empirical argument
couldn’t show that it’s logically impossible for empirical beliefs to be based on experiences. But it’s
not intended to; it’s intended to show that some (many) empirical beliefs aren’t and, more impor-
tantly, that there’s no good reason to think that any empirical beliefs are based on experiences.
2 AGAINST THE FIRST DOGMA
According to the first dogma, having a perceptual experience as of x’s being F justifies, as wemight
call it, an F-ness-related empirical belief: a belief either that x is F (if it’s a perceptual belief) or
that the subject is having an experience as of x’s being F (if it’s an introspective belief). I mean
for F to range over the kinds of properties common sense holds to be standardly attributed in
perceptual judgment: red, round, nearby, furry, perhaps horse, car, etc. as well, although there
will be debates about exactly which properties are included. The first dogma is compatible with
the claim that other enabling factors besides experience (e.g., reliability, or higher-order beliefs
about reliability) are also needed for the justification of empirical beliefs.
This view founders on cases of novel or otherwise unfamiliar experience. Consider Frank Jack-
son’s (1982) famous case of Mary, who sees red for the first time. (What matters for us now is not
Mary’s scientific knowledge but just the fact that she’s having color experiences for the first time.)
Intuitively, Mary would have no idea that it’s red she’s seeing (absent contextual cues), which
means that she isn’t justified in believing either that she’s seeing something red or that she’s having
an experience as of something’s being red. That is, Mary isn’t propositionally justified in redness-
related empirical beliefs, and should she happen to somehow pick a redness-related empirical
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belief and base it on her experience of red, she wouldn’t be doxastically justified. Mary’s expe-
rience of red might justify the belief that she’s having an experience, and maybe certain beliefs
about that experience, but it won’t justify her in any redness-related beliefs.8 Hence, on the face of
it, the first dogma is false.
One might insist that Mary really is justified in her redness-related beliefs. If it were that easy,
Jackson’s original argument shouldn’t have gotten so much attention: she’d have already known
what it was like to see red. Anyhow, in the current version,Mary needn’t be a superscientist, which
makes it all the more obvious that she’s not justified in any redness-related beliefs.
Would it help if we added in some reliability? It shouldn’t, at least not for those who are moved
by clairvoyance-type objections to externalism. Mary might in fact be getting it right consistently,
having (for no good reason) connected that particular experiencewith the concept of red; but from
her perspective, it’s just an accident. If you’re attracted to internalism, the reliability won’t help.
If you’re not attracted to internalism, it’s hard to see why the experience would be necessary.
What if instead of reliability, we require believed reliability? It’s hard to know what to say about
this. On the one hand, if I’m justified in believing that most of my beliefs about D are true, and
that b is a belief about D, then I have inductive evidence for b, and so b should be justified. On the
other hand, it’s tempting to think that if b is the result of just guessing, then b is unjustified, even
if I’m justified in thinking otherwise.
Whatever it is that Mary undergoes for the first time when she finally sees color: that’s what I
assume epistemologists mean by their talk about perceptual experience (similarly for other con-
tents and other sensemodalities). But that thing is not up to the task of justifying empirical beliefs.
I anticipate two initially credible lines of response. The first concedes that experiences don’t jus-
tify F-ness-related beliefs as characterized above directly, but argues that they can do so indirectly
for us, because we have knowledge that Mary lacks. The second concedes that Mary’s experiences
don’t justify F-ness-related beliefs, but argues that ours can, because our experiences are impor-
tantly different from Mary’s. I’ll consider these in order.
Onemight propose thatMary’s experience justifies her in believing that x isG; but only laterwill
she figure out that G things are red and then become justified in believing that x was red. Details
will vary, depending on whether or not perceptual beliefs are thought to derive their justification
from introspective beliefs, a la classical foundationalism. ‘G’ here would pick out a special kind of
concept—a noncomparative, or demonstrative, or phenomenal, or perceptual, or de re concept,
for example. G might be co-extensive with red, thus enabling Mary to think of red that x instan-
tiates it; but the thought that x is G is distinct from the thought that x is red (as evidenced by the
admitted fact that Mary is justified in the former but not the latter).
One could accept this as an ontogenetic theory about the origin of concepts like red, while deny-
ing any epistemological consequences, just as onemight hold that we can have a priori knowledge
involving empirically acquired concepts. But the view under consideration is one that takes the
naive Mary as an epistemological model for us: we’re just like her, but without the naivete. On
this view, the experience doesn’t directly justify a redness-related empirical belief, but a G-ness-
related belief; and it’s up to the subject to connect G-ness with redness, outside of experience. We
might now find such a view far too intellectualist, especially in its classical foundationalist forms:
these require the agent to do significant reasoning just to get to the belief that she’s appeared
to redly, which is where a less demanding classical foundationalism—already generally deemed
hyper-intellectualist—started out. I’ll briefly return to classical foundationalism in section 3.
More plausible is a modest foundationalist implementation of this basic idea, where G is a
feature of external objects, not of experiences (McGrath, 2017, 2018). As far as I can tell, the view
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has few adherents, partly perhaps because it is still highly intellectualist, partly perhaps because
it locates the difference between us and Mary in the cognitive, post-experiential realm.
A more popular response, I expect, is the second one. This holds that there is an experiential,
not just an intellectual, difference between us and Mary: her experience is importantly unlike
our normal, typical, paradigmatic experiences, so even if hers isn’t able to justify any empirical
beliefs, ours might still be. When I look at something red I have not only what Mary has, but
also something further: some firm sense of redness qua redness. This additional element has been
characterized in various ways: as a disposition or inclination to believe x is red (Conee, 2013); as a
distinct kind of propositional attitude—a “seeming”—that x is red (Tucker, 2010); a belief that x
looks red (Glüer, 2009); or simply the belief that x is red (Quilty-Dunn, 2015), etc. I’m going to be
decidedly neutral about what this extra component is, except to note two important factors: that
(i) whatever it is, it has a transparent and intrinsic connection to the concept of red—you couldn’t
be in this state and have no idea whether the relevantly connected belief is that x is red or that x
is blue; and (ii) Mary doesn’t have it.
We need terms for the kind of state that Mary is in and for the further kind of state that we are
normally in. To maintain neutrality, I’ll simply call them “A-states” and “B-states,” respectively.9
I mean for these to be exclusive: a B-state is the conscious, nondoxastic state we’re normally in,
in perception, with the part that Mary is in (the A-state) subtracted out. I mean that residual sense
of redness qua redness, over and above what Mary experiences.
I assume that A-states and B-states can vary independently. It is surely conceptually possible to
be in anA-statewithout being in the normally accompanying B-state. This is what theMary exam-
ple supposes. It seems to be empirically possible as well; the first time an adult experiences intoxi-
cation or orgasm, for example, the context often indicates what kind of experience it is and how to
conceptualize it, but there’s nothing in the experience itself that does so. More contentiously, this
may be what’s happening in cases of associative agnosia (Bayne, 2009; Lyons, 2009), where sub-
jects are able to accurately draw what they’re seeing but have no idea what kind of thing they just
drew. It is also conceptually possible to have B-states without A-states. As for empirical possibility,
this may be what is happening in certain types of blindsight (Macpherson, 2015), and perhaps in
proprioception, where we “just know” where our limbs are without looking, though there doesn’t
seem to be any further somatic experience beyond that “just knowing”10 (we’ll see some other
potential cases in section 3 below). Change blindness (Simons & Levin, 1997) is plausibly a case
of differences in A-state without differences in B-state.11
Given this independence, there’s no obvious reason why one couldn’t have A-states and
B-states together, which fail to “match.” That is, our red′ A-states are normally accompanied by
red* B-states, but it seems possible to have red′ A-states accompanied by green* B-states, and
vice versa, with many more possible variations.12 I’ll return to this below.
Could B-states, rather than A-states, serve as the experiences that justify empirical beliefs in
accordance with the first dogma? This is a strange proposal. First of all, it’s odd to think of isolated
B-states as experiences in any obvious sense. Intuitively, Mary could have the very same visual
experience when she sees red that we do, even though she’s not—by definition—in the same
B-state. There’s a difference, but it’s not a difference in visual experience.13 Second, it’s doubtful
that many experientialists will be attracted to this view anyhow. A superblindsighter (Block, 1995)
might have the B-state that x is red without having any A-state at all. Maybe a zombie could as
well, depending onhowweunderstandB-states. I think that few experientialists will want to grant
justification to such agents, let alone the same justification that we have.14 Such a view doesn’t
seem to be motivated either by common sense or by the kinds of intuitions that motivate a more
generic experientialism.
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If A-states by themselves don’t justify empirical beliefs, and neither do B-states by them-
selves, what about combined A+B-states? This strikes me as a cheap move. Dialectically, it works
momentarily: since the combined state is the state we’re normally in, and we’re normally prima
facie justified in our perceptual beliefs, the counterexamples (Mary, zombies) go away. But the
view is now completely ad hoc and has nothing going for it by way of principle or motivation,
unless the experientialist can show that (and how)A and B can do together what theywere unable
to do separately.
I see two possibilities here.
The first is to treat experience like a two-premise argument where neither premise by itself is
much or any evidence for the conclusion. ‘It’s raining’ doesn’t justify me in thinking the roads
will be icy; neither does ‘it’s below 0’. Together, however, they do. Similarly, neither premise of
modus ponens is alone any reason to believe the conclusion. The modus ponens example doesn’t
help. Modus ponens is a poor analogy for perceptual justification. First off, the “inference” from
experience to empirical belief isn’t valid, even with both “premises.” Second, it’s not clear that
the conclusion is even much more likely to be true when the agent is in the combined state than
when she’s in either component alone. Maybe then perception is more like the icy roads case?
But the icy roads argument is really an enthymematic, three-premise argument; it only provides
justification when the agent has an additional, justified belief that when the other premises are
true, the conclusion is probably true. Applied to the perceptual case, this would require ordinary
agents to have justified beliefs about conjunctions of A-states and B-states. This is undeniably too
intellectualist, especially given the fact that even most epistemologists have failed to distinguish
A-states from B-states and thus weren’t even disposed to have the required beliefs.
The second possibility is that one of the two states serves not like an additional premise, but
as an enabling condition for the other state. The question now arises whether, in order to have
justificatory force, the two elements of the combined state must “match,” in the sense that if the
A-state is red′ then the B-state is also red*, rather than green*, etc. To this question, I think the
experientialist has no good answers. Either the A-state and the B-state do have to match or they
don’t. It’s not plausible that they do. Remember thatwhenMary is in a red′A-state, she has no idea
whether she’s seeing something red, or green, or blue, etc. Suppose she happens, coincidentally
and for no good reason, to also be in a red* B-state; is she now justified in believing something
is red? Is she any more justified than she would have been if she’d been in a blue′ A-state, or
a red′ A-state and a blue* B-state? She doesn’t seem to be any more justified in the case where
the components happen to match than in the case where they happen not to match. Well then,
suppose they don’t have to match. Then which one determines justification? If I’m in a green′
A-state and a red* B-state should I believe there’s something red or something green before me?
Whichever one we choose, we make the exact nature of the other state irrelevant. Suppose, for
example, I say that a red* B-state justifies the belief that there’s something red nearby, but only if
there’s an accompanying—not necessarily matching—A-state. Then the A-state could be red′ or
green′ or sweet′ or ticklish—it wouldn’t matter at all. This is problematic. Where you might have
thought that which A-state she’s in mattered to what the agent is justified in believing, this view
has it that any old A-state serves merely as assurance that the accompanying B-state—whatever
it may be—is to be trusted.15 This is problematic on its face, but it also again makes empirical
justification much more inferential than we wanted it to be, in part because it’s hard to see how
this could be remotely successful unless the agent is justified in believing that the presence of the
one indicates reliability of the other. Then we’re back to where the additional premise solution
led us.
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In a way, the A+B-state conjunction was almost exactly what the experientialist needed, since
experientialism seemed much more plausible before the A-state/B-state distinction was drawn.
I say “almost,” however, because what’s really needed is not a conjunction, but a conflation: the
experientialist needs there to not be a distinction between A-states and B-states; she needs for
Mary’s phenomenology to have intrinsic conceptual content, or for the conceptual representa-
tional state to have intrinsic sensory phenomenology. Once a distinction between A-states and
B-states is granted, however, the closest the experientialist can get is a combined, or conjunctive,
state. I think we’ve seen that this is an inadequate substitute.
If perceptual experiences are simply states of the sort that we share with Mary, then it’s fairly
clear what experiences are, but it’s equally clear that these aren’t nearly sufficient for the justifica-
tion of empirical (e.g.., redness-related) beliefs. If experiences are supposed to be something more
than this, then it’s rather mysterious what exactly they’re supposed to be (hence my deliberate
neutrality and “B-state” terminology) and disappointing that so few experientialists bother to try
to tell us. I have argued that whatever we take this extra something to be, it is unlikely to be any
more capable of conferring justification than the state Mary is in. Thus, it should not be part of
any received orthodoxy that perceptual experiences justify empirical beliefs.
Along theway, I’vementioned and set aside two very different approaches thatmight save expe-
rientialism: McGrath’s (2017) view that experiences directly justify G-ness-related, rather than
redness-related beliefs, and Tucker’s (2010) view that blindsight patients’ B-states justify their
beliefs. These, and surely other, views are very much worth taking seriously, but they are, and
ought to be, controversial. Neither should be assumed without argument at the start of inquiry. If
one of these is required to save the first dogma, then it is very far from the obvious truism it is so
often presented as being.
3 AGAINST THE SECOND DOGMA
The second dogma insists that empirical beliefs get their justification from experiences by being
based on those experiences. Again, I’ll read the generic as claiming that justified empirical beliefs
are commonly or normally or paradigmatically based on perceptual experiences. If this principle
is to have anti-skeptical implications, it must be the case that empirical beliefs normally, or at
least often enough, stand in this relation to experiences. In fact, I think that most epistemologists,
including everyone cited in notes 2–5 above (except myself), presume that common, normal, or
paradigmatic empirical beliefs are thus based on experiences. Here I want to argue that there’s no
reason to think they ever—let alone normally—are.
Again, I’m only interested in a particular, although I think very widely endorsed, conception of
the basing relation. According to this conception, for a belief to be based on b, it is not enough (nor
is it necessary) that the agent could or would cite b as a reason. The belief must stand in some kind
of dependency relation—minimally, some causal, counterfactual, or explanatory relation—to b;
b must be in some important sense why (or part of why) the belief is held. Importantly, not just
any old causal/counterfactual/explanatory relation is sufficient for basing, as we will see shortly. I
won’t try to analyze this dependence relation further, partly because I want to stay neutral on the
details. I do want to be very explicit, however, that I’m working with a dependence conception of
basing, not a citable reason conception.16
Even construed so schematically, the second dogma commits to a contingent, non-normative
thesis about why people hold the empirical beliefs they do. This “experiential basing hypothesis”
holds that empirical beliefs stand in whichever causal, counterfactual, or explanatory relation to
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experiences is required for basing. This is an empirical hypothesis, but one that has gone largely
unquestioned. Even though of central importance to many epistemologies, no one, to my knowl-
edge, has ever tried to defend it.
In demanding evidence for this view, I’m not simply trying to preemptively ban folk psychol-
ogy from figuring in philosophical theorizing. I don’t deny, for example, that our beliefs often
cause our actions, nor would I object to this “belief-action assumption” serving as a cornerstone of
practical philosophy. Rather, I think that the experiential basing hypothesis is importantly differ-
ent; it’s dubious even by folk psychological standards.
We do observe an extremely pervasive and fairly systematic correlation between our experi-
ences and our empirical beliefs. It seems, further, quite reasonable to infer some kind of counter-
factual relation between the two: if I didn’t have the visual experience I’m having right now (or a
roughly similar one), I wouldn’t believe that it’s raining. I will grant all this. But it’s not enough
for basing. The correlations and counterfactuals just granted are compatible with, for example,
experiences and beliefs being mere joint effects of a common cause. Were that the case, however,
the beliefs wouldn’t have been based on the experiences after all; there’s no dependence of the
belief on the experience; the experience predicts, but doesn’t explain, the belief. This wouldn’t be
the kind of counterfactual relation involved in basing.
This is more than just a bare possibility. There are three lines of empirical research that give
us positive reason to suspect or believe that the counterfactual relation between experiences and
beliefs is not the right sort for basing. Fortunately, I think, it’s possible to make this argument
without having settled the exact nature of the required counterfactual relation.
The first line of research concerns the fact of unconscious perception in general. Despite con-
troversy surrounding the precise scope, it is now very widely accepted, on the basis of a broad and
disparate range of studies, that a good deal of perception is unconscious: that subjects are process-
ing perceptual information, perhaps in very sophisticated ways, without being aware of or having
an experience (as) of the relevant stimulus (for overviews see Kouider andDehaene (2007); Berger
(2014); for a debate about unconscious perception see Phillips and Block (2016)).
The general phenomenon of unconscious perception shows that conscious experience is not
necessary for the informational task of perception. What I mean is that conscious experience isn’t
needed in order to distinguish the word doctor from proctor, or from dictator. Consciousness isn’t
needed to determine whether that thing over there is a face or a house, etc. The clearest cases
of unconscious perception are not clear cases of perceptual belief, however, so experience might
still be needed for turning that perceptual information into a conscious belief. But even if this
is true (it’s not obvious that it is), experience is contributing only to the “belief-ness” of the per-
ceptual information, or to the consciousness of that belief, not to the content of that belief. This
would make experiential basing very different from more familiar and obvious forms of basing.
In inference, the conclusion depends (causally, counterfactually, explanatorily) on the premises
for its content. If we borrow the image of believing that p as constituted by the placing of a p-
representation in a “belief box” (Schiffer, 1981), then what inference does is not just to determine
which box the representation gets put in, but also, crucially, which representation gets put in
the box. This isn’t just a quirk of inferential basing, one that might be absent or optional in other
species of basing; it’s central to the idea that the basing relation is at once both causal (or otherwise
explanatory) and rational. Suppose we discovered that empirical beliefs do causally require expe-
riences, but only for their “belief-ness:” without an experience there’s no belief, but (to echo some
possibilities from section 2 above) any old experience would produce the same belief, because
belief content is settled completely independently of experience. I would not consider that the
kind of causal dependency constitutive of basing.
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It remains intuitively compelling that there are counterfactual connections between the con-
tents of our experiences and the contents of our beliefs. I’ll grant that these counterfactual con-
nections hold. But the existence of unconscious perception indicates that these counterfactual
relations hold for some reason other than that the content of the belief depends on the content
of the experience. One fact that’s emerged from the last few decades of consciousness research
is that we lack a compelling account of what consciousness in general—and hence perceptual
experience in particular—is for, what good it does for the conscious entity. The second dogma
seems intuitively plausible insofar as the following seems an intuitive answer to this question:
experience, at least standardly and at least in part, enables the selection of empirical beliefs (i.e.,
allows us to settle on which empirical beliefs to have). This is an empirical claim, however, one
that we’ve seen no reason to believe and some significant reason to deny.
A second line of research concerns the time course of perception. There are good reasons, both
theoretical and straightforwardly empirical, to think that perceptual judgment happens faster
than perceptual experience. If so, then the former can’t depend in the relevant sense on the latter.
The three scientific theories of consciousness with the most currency right now are some
kind of higher order representation (HOR) theory (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), neuronal global
workspace theory (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Baars et al., 2013), or recurrent processing theory
(Lamme, 2006; Lamme & Rolfsema, 2000).17 On each of these views, consciousness—perceptual
experience—requires some further processing beyond that involved in mere (unconscious) per-
ception. For HOR, it’s a kind of metarepresentation of the perceptual state; for global workspace,
it’s broadcasting or otherwise making available the perceptual state; for recurrent processing,
it’s a second stage of processing, after the perceptual state results from the feedforward sweep.
Whichever of these ways we go, (a) the timing is wrong for the second dogma: the categorical
information (‘that’s red’; ‘that’s a cat’) comes before the experience, not after, and (b) the depen-
dency relation is inverted: the experience causally, counterfactually, and explanatorily depends
on the categorical information, not the other way around.
Direct physiological studies concur that the perceptual information or perceptual judgment
comes first, and the experience comes later. Various behavioral (Kirschner & Thorpe, 2006) and
electrophysiological (Thorpe et al., 1996; VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001) data show that categorical
information can be acquired quite quickly: between 120 ms and 150 ms to determine whether the
scene contains, say, an animal or a vehicle.18 It’s unclear exactly when consciousness happens, but
on any of the reasonable competing views, it’s later than this. One possibility is that the marker of
consciousness is the visual awareness negativity (VAN) (Koivisto&Revonsuo, 2010), which occurs
at 200–240 ms. Another contender is the P3b (aka late positivity (LP)) marker, which happens at
300–500 ms (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011)). More recently, studies using MEG instead of EEG or
ERP, have suggested that consciousness may arise as early as 180–230 ms (Mai et al., 2019). Again,
whichever of these we adopt, it’s too late for the conscious experience to serve as the basis for the
perceptual judgment. Whatever kind of dependency is involved in basing, it requires the basis not
to postdate the thing based on it.
These appear to be actual beliefs, not just perceptual information, that precede experience. In
Kirschner and Thorpe’s (2006) study, for example, subjects are able to saccade to the photograph
that contains an animal 120 ms after stimulus presentation, when instructed to do so. This is a
voluntary, deliberate, person-level action, one that presumably reflects the person’s beliefs about
which photo contains the animal.
It’s gratifying that the timing data fit sowell with the credible theories of what conscious experi-
ence is. Together, these two considerations suggest very strongly that perceptual judgment is not
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causally, or counterfactually, or explanatorily dependent on perceptual experience; if anything,
the reverse is true.
The third line of research concerns perception of abstract categories. Classic psychologicalwork
on concepts (Rosch 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) distinguishes between basic level categories, like dog,
chair, and car, from both subordinate level categories like terrier, lounger, sedan, and superor-
dinate categories like animal, furniture, and vehicle. The basic level categories are the ones sub-
jects normally spontaneously employ when asked to verbally categorize stimuli and were initially
proposed to be the default entry points for perceptual identification (Rosch et al., 1976, see also
Fodor (1983), Lyons (2009)). A good deal of evidence now indicates that people (and animals) often
form superordinate category judgments before forming basic level judgments. In studies of rapid
visual categorization, subjects are able to very quickly determine things likewhether or not there’s
an animal in the presented photo (Thorpe et al., 1996; Poncet & Fabre-Thorpe, 2014), or whether
or not there’s a vehicle (VanRullen & Thorpe, 2001). Surprisingly, subjects acquire superordinate
information before acquiring basic level information. They will judge that there’s an animal in
the picture before judging whether it’s a bird, a monkey, or a snake. They’ll believe it’s an outdoor
scene, even if they don’t yet have a belief about whether it’s a beach scene or a mountain scene,
etc. Perhaps the most striking instance of this general phenomenon: medical experts can often
tell (they believe and are both confident and reliable) that a slide is abnormal, even before they’ve
looked at the slide long enough to guess at better than chance where on the slide the abnormality
is located (Evans et al., 2013).
This “superordinate-level advantage” is counterintuitive: one would have thought—as Rosch
did—that basic level judgments normally came first and that superordinate category judgments
were inferentially based on these. But this, apparently, is wrong.19 This matters because the expe-
riential basing hypothesis is much more plausible on the Roschian view.
The subject knows it’s a vehicle before she knows whether it’s a car, motorcycle, or sailboat.
The experientialist needs a plausible causal story running from some experience to the formation
of the category judgment, but the only attractive option has just been removed; it can no longer
plausibly be argued that the judgment is based on a car-experience or amotorcycle-experience, for
example, orwe’d see a basic-level, rather than a superordinate-level advantage. There’s no credible
account in terms of experience of low-level features, like texture or color (Poncet & Fabre-Thorpe,
2014; VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001). This leaves only something like vehicle-experiences. Maybe
it’s possible (though I think difficult) to believe that we can visually experience a car as a vehicle,
but what’s needed here is quite different, since car isn’t in the picture yet, and there isn’t any
particular that’s seen as a vehicle. Instead, the experientialistmustmaintain that visual experience
represents a generic vehiclehood as floating free but nevertheless instantiated somewhere or other
in the visual array. It’s not clear that this proposal is even intelligible, let alone credible.
Thus, it seems that the kind of state needed to causally or explanatorily ground the category
judgment is simply too generic and abstract to count as an experience. The pathologist has a sense
that the slide is abnormal, even though no region of the slide looks abnormal to her. This “sense”
therefore seems to be something quite different froma visual experience.Whatever the pathologist
has, it seems a zombie or blindsighter could also have. Indeed, Rensink (2004) calls this general
phenomenon “mindsight,” or “sensing without seeing,” for it involves a putative awareness in the
absence of a visual experience.20
There’s a more regimented argument, if we allow the (admittedly contentious) premise that
all (visual) experience is particular: to visually experience something as red, you must seem to
see some particular as red, and you must see it to be some particular shade of red. That red must
have a shape (perhaps fuzzy at the edges, and perhaps coextensive with the shape of the whole
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visual field) and it must be located somewhere (perhaps with fairly low precision) in your visual
field. Similarly, if you have a visual experience of a dog, you must experience the dog as having
either floppy ears or pointy ears, etc. (if the ears are visible) and as facing in some particular
direction (again, if enough of the animal is visible). If visual experience must be particular in any
of these ways, it follows straightforwardly that experiences won’t line up with the superordinate
category judgments. The perception of vehicles doesn’t involve a state with a content like ‘That
F!’ (Burge, 2010), but something more like ‘(∃x) Fx’ (Hill, 2019) or even ‘F-ness abounds.’ Such a
state seems not to qualify as an experiential state.
Notice that the argument here is entirely nonnormative. My current point is not that the expe-
rience wouldn’t justify the superordinate belief; it’s that there isn’t a plausible causal/explanatory
pathway from anything that reasonably counts as an experience to the superordinate belief, given
that it isn’t mediated by sub-superordinate beliefs or experiences.
I’ve been arguing that three lines of empirical evidence cast doubt on the experiential basing
hypothesis. Lurking just below the surface here are two very different views about the respec-
tive functions of perception and of perceptual experience. Both agree that the primary function
of perception is epistemic: it enables us to know what’s where in the environment, such informa-
tion having obvious utility. On the first view, however, this function is subserved by experience;
experiences enable us, in the normal course of events, to obtain this important information. On
the second view, experience has little to do with this function; it’s either a spandrel, or it enables
the fine-grained control of world-directed action, or it plays a supplementary epistemic role, per-
haps inmetacognition and/or in resolving ambiguities or uncertainties in cases where the normal
epistemic function hits a snag; conscious experience may be nice in various respects, but it’s in
no way crucial for perception’s main event. Both views are, of course, somewhat speculative. The
first view seems to be generally assumed by epistemologists, but there’s no reason to prefer it to
the second view. On the contrary, the empirical research just discussed fits much better with the
second view, at least for the cases I’ve been considering.
This raises an important issue, relating to the scope of the second dogma. Parts of my argument
for sidelining experience involve unconscious perception and the superordinate-level advantage.
Have I therefore only addressed a specific, and perhaps relatively rare, set of empirical beliefs,
thus leaving the second dogma intact for the remaining, typical bulk of our empirical beliefs?
First of all, theworries about the time course of perceptionwere quite general and innoway lim-
ited to unconscious or superordinate perception. Second, I have argued that at least some empiri-
cal beliefs are not plausibly based on experiences. This means the second dogma is implausible if
read as a universal generalization claiming that all empirical beliefs are based on experiences. The
experientialist is of course welcome to defend a narrower generalization, e.g., thatmany empirical
beliefs are based on experiences. But now the burden is on the experientialist to show that many
beliefs are thus based, if the thesis is to bemore than amere article of faith. So far, we haven’t seen
reason to think that any empirical beliefs are based on experiences.
I mentioned above that classical foundationalism is implausibly hyper-intellectualist. This is
a common objection, one that’s usually either left as simply intuitive, or argued for by appeal
to animals and small children; sometimes the objection assumes that beliefs about experiences
would have to be formed explicitly, in a way that fits poorly with our ordinary phenomenology.
The material of this section provides a new and very different, empirical, argument against clas-
sical foundationalism. The argument is quite simple: if perceptual beliefs (beliefs about external
objects, properties, and events) aren’t dependent on experiences in a way that’s required for bas-
ing, then they’re not dependent on beliefs about experiences either, for the simple reason that we
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don’t have even the most tacit beliefs about our experiences before we’ve had a chance to form
the experiences themselves.
4 EXPERIENCES AS SUSTAINING CAUSES?
In the previous section, I offered three arguments against the experiential basing hypothesis: one
from unconscious perception, one from the time course of perceptual experience, and one from
the superordinate-level advantage. Each of these arguments suggests that empirical beliefs don’t
depend on experiences in the way required by the second dogma. At most, however, this only
shows that empirical beliefs aren’t causally (or counterfactually or explanatorily) dependent on
experiences for their origins; they might still be thus dependent for their continued existence. Per-
ceptual processing, after all, doesn’t normally just stop after 150milliseconds. If I had an empirical
belief that p and didn’t have a corresponding experience, I would surely and rightly think some-
thing was amiss and would retract and suspend my belief that p. Experiences might in this way
causally sustain empirical beliefs, even if they don’t causally initiate them (similarly for coun-
terfactual and explanatory dependence). This would do justice to intuition and the science, and
maybe in a way that saves the experiential basing hypothesis.
Unfortunately, the dependence proposed isn’t really between the empirical belief and the expe-
rience; it’s between the empirical belief and the agent’snoticing that she didn’t have the experience.
On this proposal, had the agent lacked the experience but not noticed this fact, the empirical belief
would remain. So the belief doesn’t hinge on the presence or absence of an experience after all.
Secondly, even if there is a (causal, counterfactual, explanatory) dependence here, it’s thewrong
kind of dependence to account for prima facie justification, which is what experiences are sup-
posed to do. If you tell me it’s not raining anymore, I’ll stop believing it’s raining. This doesn’t
mean that my belief that it’s raining was or is based on your not telling me that it’s not raining.
There’s a counterfactual dependence and an epistemic dependence here, but the counterfactual
and epistemic dependencies involved in defeat are very different from the ones involved in basing.
Once the distinction between basing-dependence and defeat-dependence is offered, it’s clear that
the currently proposed role for experience is relevant to defeat and ultima facie justification, not
basing and prima facie justification. But that’s not the (only) role experiences were supposed to
play. The anti-experientialist can happily admit that not having experiences—in creatures sophis-
ticated to notice this andwho are justified in thinking that empirical beliefs formed in the absence
of experiences are unreliable—can provide defeaters (Lyons, 2009).
The problem here isn’t that experiences are merely sustaining; surely there can be genuine
basing where the causal/explanatory factor is merely sustaining and not initiating, like when we
discover new arguments for conclusions we already believed. The problem is that it’s the wrong
kind of sustaining: experiences on the current proposal are playing only a negative, rather than a
positive role. If we allow all such factors to count as bases, we’ve trivialized the concept of basing.
In cases where we deliberately reflect on and attend to our experiences, on the other hand,
experiences do play a sustaining role akin to new arguments for old conclusions. But this kind
of reflection is widely conceded to be relatively rare and not at all the standard or typical case of
perceptual belief. Even the classical foundationalist never intended for the view to apply only to
such a small minority of cases.
All of this, of course, is compatible with the possibility that there’s another, direct and posi-
tive sustaining from experiences to empirical beliefs, in addition to the negative and indirect ones
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granted. Sure, but ‘possibly p’ isn’t an argument for p (where p is contingent), and this mere pos-
sibility is no reason to believe the second dogma.
5 A REGRESS ARGUMENT FOR THE DOGMAS?
Might there be an obvious epistemological argument for the dogmas?21 If we deny that empirical
beliefs are based on experience, aren’t we left with the claim that empirical beliefs aren’t based
on anything, and does this not commit us to an unacceptable skepticism? Isn’t experientialism
necessary to solve the regress problem?
This line of thinking supposes that experientialism is the only game in town. But this is clearly
false. There are various doxastic (non-experientialist) versions of foundationalism, coherentism
(BonJour, 1985; Lehrer, 1990), and infinitism (Klein, 2005) as well as various externalist theories,
like reliabilism (Goldman, 1986; Lyons, 2009), proper functionalism (Burge, 2003; Graham, 2012),
and knowledge-first epistemology (Williamson, 2000). All these views avoid skepticism.All offer a
solution to the regress problem, even if one that the experientialist wouldn’t like. All of these views
are live options, although of course we each have our own preferences. Treating experientialism
as the only game in town would be quite obviously question-begging.
And anyway, one of the two dogmas is a straightforwardly empirical thesis; it commits to a
contingent claim about human psychology. There is something extremely suspicious about draw-
ing contingent, psychological conclusions from what are apparently a priori, epistemological
premises. This is not to say, of course, that such a move is unheard of, although it ought to be.
6 CONCLUSION
Agreatmany epistemologists hold two related views: (a) that perceptual experiences justify empir-
ical beliefs, and (b) that they do so by serving as the agent’s bases for these beliefs. Together these
constitute a kind of experientialist orthodoxy. Not only are these generally embraced without
argument, as mere articles of faith, but there are serious reasons to doubt, even to deny, them.
Experientialism should not be a default view in epistemology.22
ENDNOTES
1 Especially Lyons (2009, 2016a).
2 E.g., McDowell (1982), Millar (2019), Schellenberg (2018).
3 E.g., Pollock (1974), Audi (1993), Alston (1988), Pryor (2000), Feldman (2003), Chudnoff (2018), McGrath (2018),
andmany others. I understandmodest foundationalism to be that kind of foundationalism that holds that some
basic beliefs are about external objects (/events, properties, etc.); as such it could include nonexperientialist
forms of reliabilism (Lyons, 2009) as well as these experientialist views.
4 E.g., Descartes (1641/1996), Locke (1690/1979), Russell (1912/1997), Chisholm (1977), McGrew (1995), Fumerton
(2001), BonJour (2003), and many others.
5 E.g., Conee (1988), Kvanvig and Riggs (1992), Gupta (2006).
6 The parenthetical is needed if we’re not to presuppose evidentialism: that all justification is determined by rea-
sons, or evidence. For twonon-evidentialistways to understand the propositional/doxastic distinction, see Lyons
(2016b), Graham and Lyons (forthcoming).
7 See Carter and Bondy (2019) for the latest on the basing relation.
8 It is worth emphasizing that my concern here is only with the justificatory power of experiences vis-a-vis empir-
ical beliefs: perceptual beliefs about the layout of distal features in the environment, or the corresponding
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introspective beliefs—hence the interest in Mary’s redness-related belief. In other work (Lyons, 2016a) I’ve
argued that even beliefs like “I’m having a vivid experience” aren’t justified by the experience in the way most
epistemologists think, but I’m not trying to rehash that here.
9 In other works (Lyons, 2005, 2009, 2015, 2016a, 2018) I have tried to say something informative about A-states
and B-states. I think it’s important to do so, but I worry that the theoretical baggage distracts from the central
argumentation here, hence the current, forced neutrality.
10 Or if there is, it doesn’t seem to be sufficiently discriminable from other somatic experiences that there might
be an introspectively distinguishable proprioceptive A-state for every introspectively distinguishable proprio-
ceptive B-state. Huemer (2001) discusses proprioception in a similar way, although he’s not eager to distinguish
A-states and B-states.
11 This A-state/B-state distinction requires that experiences are “factorizable,” as Matt McGrath (personal com-
munication) helpfully describes it. This strikes me as unobjectionable, at least on the assumption (which I’m
granting to my opponent for the sake of argument) that B-states are genuinely experiential. If red things look
different to us than they do to Mary, this must involve an addition to, not an alteration of, Mary’s experience
(except, of course, insofar as addition in general trivially entails alteration). It’s not, after all, as if red things look
to Mary more purplish, or more saturated, or somehow less in possession of a color property, or something.
12 The primes and asterisks are included as reminders that the states themselves aren’t red or blue etc. in the way
that distal objects might be. And of course, B-states aren’t red′ in the way that A-states might be. I trust it’s clear
enough what’s meant by saying that a B-state is red*. This phrasing is useful for the sakes of both brevity and
neutrality about the nature of B-states.
13 There are clashing intuitions here. Siegel’s (2006, 2011) phenomenal contrast argument concludes, essentially,
that differences of B-state can constitute differences in visual experience. I can’t tell whether her argument is
intended (a) to buttress an intuitively obvious claim (that ‘pine’ and ‘red’ can literally be part of the content
of visual experience) or (b) to reveal a surprising and counterintuitive claim (that ‘pine’ and ‘red’ can literally
be part of the content of visual experience). I think the phenomenal contrast argument fails to take B-states
sufficiently seriously (see Reiland (2014)), but I also read it as attempting (b). This would help explain why the
argument has generated so much controversy.
14 Chris Tucker (2010) is a notable exception, regarding blindsight, and is explicit on this point. I myself am happy
to ascribe justification in such cases, if the B-state is reliably produced (Lyons, 2009, 2015), but this is very much
less a rescue of experientialism than a rejection of it in favor of reliabilist externalism. I think if you’re saying
that zombies and blindsighters are justified (even just prima facie), you’re not avowing experientialism.
15 Obviously, the same considerations hold, swapping the As and Bs, if you think it’s the A-state, rather than the
B-state, that determines which beliefs are justified.
16 These are the two broad conceptions of basing found in the literature. My sense is that the dependence view is
much more popular; in addition, it seems more conducive to the possibility of nondoxastic bases, like experi-
ences, since the relevant citing of reasons seems to just be the citing of beliefs.
17 There’s also Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2008) and panpsychism (see Bruntrup and Jaskolla (2016)),
but the latter is hardly a scientific theory, and I won’t try to take either seriously here.
18 Some have argued that category information is acquired much faster than this. Mandelbaum (2018) seems to
think it happens in about 13 ms. This would be even better for my argument, but I don’t find it at all convincing.
Although hementions the studies I’ve cited here,Mandelbaum’smain argument for the very short times is based
on duration of stimulus presentation (especially Potter et al. (2014)). This tells us nothing about processing time
for categorization unlesswe assume—contrary to the prevalent “carwash”model (Wolfe, 2003)—that processing
of one stimulus stops as soon as a new stimulus appears. In contrast, the classic Thorpe studies found differences
in ERP signals between trials where the subject correctly judged the category to be present vs. absent, at 150 ms
after stimulus onset; the later studies with Kirschner found behavioral responses (saccades) as early as 120 ms.
These studies therefore don’t require that problematic assumption.
19 I confess I got this wrong in Lyons (2009).
20 It is, of course, possible to understand these “sensings” as among the B-states of section 2. If so, we should deny
that B-states—or at least these B-states—are experiences. I’m inclined to do so anyhow (Lyons, 2005).
21 Surely there are sets of controversial epistemological theses that jointly entail one or both dogmas; one could
use these to argue for those dogmas (Smithies, 2019). What I’m asking about here is whether the dogmas
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follow straightforwardly fromepistemological platitudes, such that theymight reasonably serve as unquestioned
starting points in theory development.
22 Earlier versions of this paper were presented (via Zoom) at the University of Glasgow and University of St
Andrews; thanks to audiences there, especially Derek Brown, Jessica Brown, Sandy Goldberg, Fiona Macpher-
son, and Gillian Russell. Thanks to Peter Graham, Matt McGrath, and Jake Quilty-Dunn for helpful comments
on written drafts.
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